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ment of the action. The Carrick Court held that in such case the
plaintiff was entitled to reinstitute the action with the benefit of
the extension of the statute of limitations. In a related case, Jones
v. State, the Court held that the premature filing of a wrongful
death claim in an action against the state constituted a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal. Left open by the Jones Court is
the availability of the CPLR 205(a) extension in an action in the
Court of Claims.
Feldman v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.,
among the important lower court cases commented upon, examined a plaintiff's options for recovery of a judgment in an impleader situation where the main defendant is insolvent. The Supreme Court, Kings County, held that a defendant may satisfy a
judgment against him with funds borrowed pursuant to an agreement arranged by the plaintiff, thus enabling the defendant to enforce a contribution claim against a solvent but otherwise unreachable third-party defendant. Also treated in The Survey is
Aversano v. Town of Brookhaven, wherein the Appellate Division,
Second Department, held that service of a summons without a
complaint or CPLR 305(b) notice is a jurisdictional defect. Notably, the court further held that service of a notice of appearance
and demand for a complaint by the defendant results in a waiver
of this defect.
It is hoped that through presentation of these and other important decisions, The Survey will continue to keep the practitioner aware of recent developments in New York practice.
ARTICLE 2-LMITATIONS OF

TIME

CPLR 205(a): Six-month extension available where wrongful
death action dismissed for want of a duly appointed
administrator
When an action, timely commenced, is dismissed for reasons
other than a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to prosecute, or a
final judgment on the merits, CPLR 205(a) enables the plaintiff to
commence a new action within 6 months of the dismissal.1 Recent
CPLR 205(a) provides:
(a) New action by plaintiff. If an action is timely commenced and is terminated in
any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment on the merits, the
plaintiff, or, if he dies, and the cause of action survives, his executor or adminis-
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case law, though, raised the question whether CPLR 205(a) is
available to revive a wrongful death action dismissed for failure to
name a duly appointed administrator in the summons.2 In Carrick
trator, may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or
series of transactions or occurrences within six months after the termination provided that the new action would have been timely commenced at the time of the
commencement of the prior action.
CPLR 205(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). In addition to the three statutory exceptions to
CPLR 205(a), there is a fourth common-law exception: a defect in personal jurisdiction. See
George v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 178, 390 N.E.2d 1156, 1160, 417 N.Y.S.2d 231,
236 (1979); Smalley v. Hutcheon, 296 N.Y. 68, 73, 70 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1946); Erickson v.
Macy, 236 N.Y. 412, 415, 140 N.E. 938, 939 (1923); CPLR 205(a) commentary at 61 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). The rationale behind this exception is that since an action is not
commenced-and personal jurisdiction over the defendant is not obtained--"unless there is
[proper] service of the summons," defective service constitutes noncommencement. See Erickson v. Macy, 236 N.Y. 412, 416, 140 N.E. 938, 939 (1923). Hence, CPLR 205(a) is not
available because it contemplates that a prior action had been commenced. Id. See George
v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 178, 390 N.E.2d 1156, 1160, 417 N.Y.S.2d 231, 236
(1979). It has been suggested, however, that when a defendant receives timely notice of an
initial action which is dismissed due to a defect in personal jurisdiction, CPLR 205(a)
should nonetheless apply. See Amato v. Svedi, 35 App. Div. 2d 672, 672, 315 N.Y.S.2d 63,
64-65 (2d Dep't 1970) (mem.); SmGEL § 52, at 54; note 26 and accompanying text infra.
See George v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 179-80, 390 N.E.2d 1156, 1160-61,
417 N.Y.S.2d 231, 237 (1979); Goldberg v. Camp Mikan-Recro, 42 N.Y.2d 1029, 1029-30, 369
N.E.2d 8, 8, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009 (1977) (mem.); Carrick v. Central Gen. Hosp., 71 App.
Div. 2d 226, 229, 422 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (2d Dep't 1979), rev'd, 51 N.Y.2d 242, 253, 414
N.E.2d 632, 638, 434 N.Y.S.2d 130, 136 (1980). In George, a unanimous Court of Appeals
held that a defect in the identity of the named plaintiff in a survival action would not
preclude application of CPLR 205(a). 47 N.Y.2d at 178-79; 390 N.E.2d at 1161, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 236-37. In so holding, the Court distinguished between survival and wrongful
death actions. George v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 180, 390 N.E.2d 1156, 1161-62,
417 N.Y.S.2d 231, 237 (1979). Indeed, in concluding that CPLR 205(a) is applicable to survival actions, the Court noted that "there is a fundamental difference between an action for
wrongful death and an action which survives the death of the injured party." Id. This distinction between wrongful death and survival actions was wrought by the George Court in
reaction to its Goldberg opinion. In Goldberg, the Court had held that the plaintiff could
not amend-under CPLR 203(e)-a flawed and time-barred wrongful death complaint, since
CPLR 203(e) permits amendments only to preexisting actions. Goldberg v. Camp MikanRecro, 42 N.Y.2d 1029, 1029-30, 369 N.E.2d 8, 8, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009 (1979) (citing
Vastola v. Maer, 39 N.Y.2d 1019, 355 N.E.2d 300, 387 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1976) and Caffaro v.
Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 319 N.E.2d 174, 360 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1974)). Subsequently, in Carrick,
the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that in light of George, CPLR 205(a) was
not available to revive a wrongful death action dismissed for failure to name an administrator in the summons. Carrick v. Central Gen. Hosp., 71 App. Div. 2d 226, 229, 422 N.Y.S.2d
112, 115 (2d Dep't 1979), rev'd, 51 N.Y.2d 242, 253, 414 N.E.2d 632, 638, 434 N.Y.S.2d 130,
136 (1980). Nevertheless, prior to the George and Carrick decisions, it had been well settled
that CPLR 205(a) was available when the original action had been a wrongful death action.
See Sharrow v. Inland Lines, Ltd., 214 N.Y. 101, 110-11, 108 N.E. 217, 220 (1915); Mogavero
v. Stony Creek Dev. Corp., 53 App. Div. 2d 1021, 1022, 385 N.Y.S.2d 899, 900 (4th Dep't
1976) (mem.); Mehrer v. North Ninth Lumber Co., 275 App. Div. 1059, 1059, 92 N.Y.S.2d
178, 179 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 276 App. Div. 784, 93 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1949).
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v. Central General Hospital,' the Court of Appeals settled the issue by holding that the section's 6-month savings provision may
properly be used to reinstitute a wrongful death action.4
In Carrick, the plaintiff commenced a wrongful death action
on behalf of her husband, an alleged victim of the defendants'
medical malpractice. At the time of commencement the plaintiff
had not been appointed administratrix of her husband's estate, but
was, nevertheless, denominated as the "proposed administratrix"
in the caption of the summons.' The defendants, noting that the
naming of an administrator is an essential element of a wrongful
death claim, moved to dismiss the complaint. Shortly after that
motion was granted, and upon her appointment as administratrix,
the plaintiff instituted a second action.' Once again the defendants
moved to dismiss, this time on the ground that the wrongful death
statute of limitations had expired." The plaintiff argued, however,
that CPLR 205(a) provides for recommencement of an action
within 6 months of dismissal.10 Special Term agreed and denied
3 Carrick v. Central Gen. Hosp., 51 N.Y.2d 242, 414 N.E.2d 632, 434 N.Y.S.2d 130
(1980), rev'g, 71 App. Div. 2d 226, 422 N.Y.S.2d 112 (2d Dep't 1979).
' 51 N.Y.2d at 252, 414 N.E.2d at 637-38, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
, Id. at 246, 414 N.E.2d at 633, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 131. The plaintiff also instituted a
survival action against the same defendants. Id. Service of a summons and notice, both for
the wrongful death and survival actions, was effected by the plaintiff barely 4 weeks before
the 2-year wrongful death statute of limitations had expired. Id. See EPTL § 5-4.1 (1967)
(2-year statute of limitations for wrongful death proceedings).
6 51 N.Y.2d at 246, 414 N.E.2d at 634, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
'Id. The defendants also moved for, and Special Term granted, dismissal of the plaintiff's survival action. Id. The defendants' motions were premised on the fact that wrongful
death and survival actions may only be instituted by a duly appointed personal representative. Id. See Mogavero v. Stony Creek Dev. Corp., 53 App. Div. 2d 1021, 1021, 385 N.Y.S.2d
899, 900 (4th Dep't 1976) (mem.); Boffe v. Consolidated Tel. & Elec. Subway Co., 171 App.
Div. 392, 157 N.Y.S. 318 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd without opinion, 222 N.Y. 654 (1919);
Beninati v. Oldsmobile Div. of Gen. Motors, 94 Misc. 2d 835, 838, 405 N.Y.S.2d 917, 918
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
8 51 N.Y.2d at 246, 414 N.E.2d at 634, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 132. Letters of administration
were issued to the plaintiff less than 1 month after the expiration of the 2-year statute of
limitations for wrongful death. Brief for Appellant at 3, Carrick v. Central Gen. Hosp., 51
N.Y.2d 242, 414 N.E.2d 632, 434 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1980).
9 51 N.Y.2d at 246, 414 N.E.2d at 634, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
'0 Brief for Appellant at 6, Carrick v. Central Gen. Hosp., 51 N.Y.2d 242, 414 N.E.2d
632, 434 N.Y.S.2d 130. The plaintiff contended that she was entitled to the 6-month savings
provision of CPLR 205(a) since the original dismissal had not been the result of either "a
voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or
a final judgment on the merits." Carrick v. Central Gen. Hosp., 71 App. Div. 2d 226, 228,
422 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (2d Dep't 1979). See CPLR 205(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); note
1 and accompanying text supra. The plaintiff argued that the prior dismissal had been
predicated merely upon her lack of legal capacity to bring the action. 71 App. Div. 2d at 228,

1981]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

the defendant's motion to dismiss.1 1 On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, relying upon the recent Court of Ap12
held that the
peals decision in George v. Mount Sinai Hospital,
plaintiff's failure to appoint a proper representative in her initial

action precluded use of CPLR 205(a) to rehabilitate her wrongful
death claim.13
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.1 4 Writing for the

Court, Judge GabrielliH1 5 explained the import of the Court's decision in George. The George Court had held that CPLR 205(a)
could be applied to reinstate an otherwise time-barred survival action.16 Judge Gabrielli stated, however, that that decision was not

intended to deny CPLR 205(a) privileges to wrongful death complainants.1 7 The Court reasoned that although the George decision
noted basic differences between wrongful death and survival actions, such differences are not dispositive under CPLR 205(a). ' In422 N.Y.S.2d at 114. The Court of Appeals rejected this line of reasoning, commenting that
the existence of a qualified representative was essential to a wrongful death action and that
there was no statutory right to recover for wrongful death until an administrator had been
named. 51 N.Y.2d at 249 n.2, 414 N.E.2d at 636 n.2, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 134 n.2. See Boffe v.
Consolidated Tel. & Elec. Subway Co., 171 App. Div. 392 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd without
opinion, 226 N.Y. 554 (1919); note 7 and accompanying text supra.
2151 N.Y.2d at 247, 414 N.E.2d at 634, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
12 47 N.Y.2d 170, 390 N.E.2d 1156, 417 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1979). See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
'a 71 App. Div. 2d 226, 228, 422 N.Y.S.2d 112, 114 (2d Dep't 1979). Relying upon
George v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 390 N.E.2d 1156, 417 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1979), the
appellate division determined that the "basis for personal injury action differs from that
underlying a wrongful death action." 71 App. Div. 2d at 229, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 114. See note 2
supra.The court further reasoned that although a survival action that had been commenced
in the name of a nonrepresentative party was a prior action within the meaning of CPLR
205(a), a similarly flawed wrongful death action was not, since the naming of an administrator is an essential element of a wrongful death action. 71 App. Div. 2d at 229, 422 N.Y.S.2d
at 114. When this essential element is found wanting, the court concluded, the initial action
must be deemed a nullity. Id.
" 51 N.Y.2d at 254, 414 N.E.2d at 638, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
Is Judge Gabrielli was joined by Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, and
Wachtler. Judges Fuchsberg and Meyer filed separate concurring opinions. Id. at 254-55,
414 N.E.2d at 639, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
16 George v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 177-78, 390 N.E.2d 1156, 1160-61, 417
N.Y.S.2d 231, 235-36 (1979). The George Court had held that although the plaintiff's first
survival action was dismissed because it was not commenced by a proper party, the action
was not a nullity within the meaning of CPLR 205(a). Id. at 177, 390 N.E.2d at 1160, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 236. See note 2 supra. Thus, the Court permitted the plaintiff to utilize CPLR
205(a) to recommence her survival action after the statute of limitations had run. 47 N.Y.2d
at 181, 390 N.E.2d at 1162, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
"7 51 N.Y.2d at 253, 414 N.E.2d at 638, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
Is 51 N.Y.2d at 250, 414 N.E.2d at 636, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 134. In addition to holding that
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deed, the proper inquiry under that section is whether a prior
timely action had been commenced, not whether or why that action had been defective. 19 The Court concluded, therefore, that the
6-month savings provision of CPLR 205(a) was available to the
plaintiff, even though the defect in issue was an essential element
of a wrongful death action.2 0
Judges Fuchsberg and Meyer concurred in the Court's opinion.21 Judge Fuchsberg, after noting his support for the majority's
rationale, emphasized that when technical errors are not prejudicial to either party, dismissal is discouraged in favor of "ameliorative" justice.2 2 In a separate concurrence, Judge Meyer maintained
that CPLR 203(e) should have been used to amend the wrongful
death claim to the survival action that also had been commenced
by the plaintiff.2 s
the differences between wrongful death and survival actions are not dispositive under CPLR
205(a), id., the Court distinguished between CPLR 205(a) and CPLR 203(e). 51 N.Y.2d at
248-49, 414 N.E.2d at 635, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 133. CPLR 203(e) provides:
(e) Claim in amended pleading. A claim asserted in an amended pleading is
deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original pleading
were interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant
to the amended pleadings.
CPLR 203(e) (1972). The CarrickCourt determined that, unlike CPLR 205(a), CPLR 203(e)
presupposes a valid preexisting action to which an amendment may be interposed. 51
N.Y.2d at 248-49, 414 N.E.2d at 635, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 133. Hence, CPLR 203(e) is not available to a plaintiff attempting to amend a flawed and time-barred wrongful death action. Id.
1" 51 N.Y.2d at 249, 414 N.E.2d at 636, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 134. The Court held that before
CPLR 205(a) could be used a prior timely action must have been commenced within the
meaning of CPLR 304. Id. at 249, 414 N.E.2d at 635, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 134. See Erickson v.
Macy, 236 N.Y. 412, 414, 140 N.E. 938, 938-39 (1923).
20 51 N.Y.2d at 252-53, 414 N.E.2d at 638, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 136. Two additional
issues
were raised in Carrick. The first was whether a dismissal for lack of an essential element of
the action did in fact "implicate the merits . . . at least in a technical sense," and thus
constitute "final judgment upon the merits." Id. at 251, 414 N.E.2d at 637, 434 N.Y.S.2d at
135. If so, the dismissal would fall within one of the statutory exceptions to CPLR 205(a).
See CPLR 205(a)(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); note 1 supra. While conceding that such a
problem might "exist on some highly abstract, theoretical plane," the Carrick Court found
that it presented no "serious impediment to the application of CPLR 205 (subd. [a].)" 51
N.Y.2d at 251, 414 N.E.2d at 637, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 135. A second issue discussed by the
Carrick Court was whether a common-law cause of action for wrongful death should be
created. The Court decided against such a course of action, reasoning that a common-law
wrongful death action would circumvent the stringent requirements of its statutory counterpart. Id. at 250 n.2, 414 N.E.2d at 636 n.2, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 134 n.2.
21 Id. at 255, 414 N.E.2d at 639, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
22 Id. at 254, 414 N.E.2d at 639, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
22 Id. at 255, 414 N.E.2d at 639, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (Meyer, J., concurring). Judge
Meyer concurred for the reasons stated in the closing paragraph of his dissent in Jones v.
State, 51 N.Y.2d 943, 952-53, 416 N.E.2d 1050, 1054-55, 435 N.Y.S.2d 715, 719-20 (1980)
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The Court's decision in Carrick appears to be the denouement
of a series of cases which have examined the relevance of CPLR
205(a) to actions fatally defective in commencement. 4 By abrogating previously suggested distinctions between wrongful death and
survival actions under CPLR 205(a), the Court has chosen a path
which is conceptually sound and in accordance with the intent of
the section.25
Additionally, it is suggested that the Carrick Court deemphasized technical barriers to courtroom adjudication by holding that CPLR 205(a) is available to plaintiffs irrespective of
whether their prior actions were flawed. Indeed, it is arguable that
the Carrick Court. was primarily concerned with receipt by the defendant of timely notice of commencement of an action, thereby
ensuring that recommencement under CPLR 205(a) would not be
prejudicial.26
(mem.) (Meyer, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Jones, Judge Meyer maintained that CPLR
203(e) properly could be employed to amend a time-barred wrongful death claim to a preexisting survival action, since the original pleading had given the defendant notice of the occurrence upon which the wrongful death claim was predicated. Id. at 952-53, 416 N.E.2d at
1054, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 720 (Meyer, J., dissenting). See The Survey, notes 155-83 and accompanying text infra. It appears that in the Carrick case, Judge Meyer would have approved of
first recommencing the plaintiff's survival action under CPLR 205(a), and then amending
her wrongful death action to the survival action under CPLR 203(e).
U The Carrick decision clarified the uncertainty arising from the George decision,
wherein it appeared that the distinctions between wrongful death and survival actions were
in issue, rather than the utilization of the appropriate remedial statute. See 51 N.Y.2d at
248, 414 N.E.2d at 635, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 133; note 2 and accompanying text supra.
25The purpose of CPLR 205(a) is to "ameliorate the potentially harsh effect of the
Statute of Limitations." George v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 177, 390 N.E.2d 1156,
1160, 417 N.Y.S.2d 231, 236 (1979). See Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 539, 109
N.E. 594, 595-96 (1915). Indeed, it is submitted that a narrow and technical construction of
CPLR 205(a) would be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute of limitations itself,
since limitations statutes are not intended merely to present procedural barriers to litigious
persons, but rather, to protect defendants from being forced to defend stale claims. See
Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 429, 248 N.E.2d 871, 872, 301 N.Y.S.2d
23, 25 (1969).
" See 51 N.Y.2d at 249, 414 N.E.2d at 635, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 133. Prior to Carrick,
commentators had urged that "fair and timely" notice be adopted as the minimum standard
for determining application of CPLR 205(a). See, e.g., CPLR 205(a), commentary at 61 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); SIEGEL § 52, at 53; 1 WK&M %2-205.03, at 2-134 (1979). Despite
such direction, the Court in George v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 170, 390 N.E.2d 1156,
417 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1979), although presented with the opportunity, expressly opted not to
resolve whether actual notice should be the sole determinative factor in applying CPLR
205(a). Id. at 178, 390 N.E.2d at 1161, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 236. Subsequently, however, the
Carrick Court stated that so long as a prior timely action "was 'commenced' within the
meaning of CPLR 304," the extension provision of CPLR 205(a) was available. 51 N.Y.2d at
249, 414 N.E.2d at 635-36, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 133-34. See note 19 and accompanying text
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Moreover, in view of the timely notice concern, it is suggested
that the Carrick Court could properly have held CPLR 203(e) applicable in lieu of CPLR 205(a).17 CPLR 203(e) permits an otherwise untimely claim asserted in an amended pleading to relate
back to claims which were timely asserted in the original pleading. 28 Thus, the use of that section to amend a dismissed wrongful
death action to a preexisting survival action would appear to satisfy the timely notice requirement and not be prejudicial to the
defendant. Such an approach would encourage procedural efficiency by obviating the need to first dismiss an action, and then
reinstitute that action under CPLR 205(a).29
David Don
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT

CPLR 305(b): Plaintiff's service of bare summons is jurisdictional
defect, but defect is waived by defendant's service of notice of appearance and demand for complaint
CPLR 305(b) requires that the summons commencing an
supra. Of course, it has been held that proper CPLR 304 service entails fulfillment of CPLR
305(b). See Young v. Franklyn, 93 Misc. 2d 508, 402 N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx
County 1978). CPLR 305(b) stipulates that when a complaint is not served with a summons,
the summons must contain a notice of the nature of the claim and the relief sought. CPLR
305(b)(McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). Nevertheless, one court has held that failure to comply
with CPLR 305(b) will not preclude the subsequent use of CPLR 205(a) to reinstitute the
claim. See Limpert v. Garland, 100 Misc. 2d 525, 419 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1979). See also CPLR 305(b) commentary at 96 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); CPLR 3012:1
commentary at 83 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981); SIEGEL § 60, at 11 (1979-1980 pam.). Thus,
timely service by summons, without CPLR 305(b) notice, would appear to be the sine qua
non to use of CPLR 205(a).
2 A similar solution was advocated by Judge Meyer in his concurrence in Carrick. See
51 N.Y.2d at 255, 414 N.E.2d at 639, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (Meyer, J., concurring) (citing
Jones v. State, 51 N.Y.2d 943, 952-53, 416 N.E.2d 1050, 1054-55, 435 N.Y.S.2d 715, 719-20
(1980) (Meyer, J., dissenting)). See note 23 and accompanying text supra. See also Caffaro
v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 319 N.E.2d 174, 360 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1974).
21 CPLR 203(e) (1972). See note 18 supra.
29 Although the utilization of CPLR 203(e) in lieu of CPLR 205(a) would be in the
interest of judicial economy, there is scant support for the concept, since the amending-back
provisions of CPLR 203(e) consistently have been held to depend on a valid preexisting
claim. See 51 N.Y.2d at 248, 414 N.E.2d at 635, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 133; Goldberg v. Camp
Mikan-Recro, 42 N.Y.2d 1029, 1030, 369 N.E.2d 8, 8, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009 (1977)
(mem.); Caffaro v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 250, 319 N.E.2d 174, 176, 360 N.Y.S.2d 847, 850
(1974); Mogavero v. Stony Creek Dev. Corp., 53 App. Div. 2d 1021, 1021, 385 N.Y.S.2d 899,
900 (4th Dep't 1976); note 18 supra.

